Wednesday, March 4, 2015

On Moral Facts and Opinions

Justin McBrayer, a Fort Lewis College professor of philosophy, has done what I dream of doing in a recent NYTimes Opinionator piece: take extended and public issue with my children’s homework.  However, my reasons for this lofty personal goal differ from Professor McBrayer’s: he seems genuinely concerned that his child is taught that there are not moral facts - facts can be tested and proven while what a person "feels, thinks, or believes" is an opinion (whether Professor McBrayer believes the school should be in the business of deciding what constitutes these moral facts – e.g. would marriage equality constitute a moral fact? Is the morality of capital punishment a moral fact? is unstated).  On the other hand, my desire to contest elementary school homework assignments stems primarily from long held authority issues…but I digress.

I’ll say two things about the piece as I’m hoping to keep this post brief: first I think assessing morality in terms of fact vs. opinion dangerously and irresponsibly shifts attention from the social, political, and legal structures that dictate which moral facts are enforceable and not enforceable.  Second, I find it to be a much more productive use of time to examine the structures within which some individuals are afforded the right to dictate which moral facts will be enforced as “fact” and which will not receive official recognition.  I would therefore like to an alternative binary through which to sort moral statements: hegemonic and anti-hegemonic.

Hegemonic ethics would be the “taken-for-granted” moral code of a particular group at a particular time whereas an anti-hegemonic ethics would be those moral codes that challenge the status quo or the “obviousness” of the hegemonic code.  Drawing on a Gramscian conception of hegemony, I think that a focus on the processes and maneuverings that are employed in the enforcement of a particular moral code or set of “good” and “bad” acts draws attention to inequalities within a social group with a particular moral vision.  In a way, this is what Professor McBrayer is doing – drawing attention to the role of the unequal power dynamics in his local elementary school (between parent/family/"private" and teacher/institution/"public" as moral authority) especially as it affects the particular social vision of his child.  We don’t need to look very far to find social theorists skeptical of the role of the school in producing a particular type of citizen (Foucault and Althusser come to mind, but certainly there are many others).


In closing, should I (hopefully) find myself in Professor McBrayer’s shoes one day, I will calmly explain to my daughter the difference between “enforceable” and “unenforceable” social norms, especially with regard to completing one’s homework, other school-related duties, and, overall, obeying the hegemon…I mean teacher.  I would further draw her attention to what theorist James Scott refers to as “offstage” sites of rebellion – that is, the subversive space outside of officially monitored spaces (the difference here is between the water cooler and the boss’ office or the prep line of kitchen and the restaurant dining room) that allow for freer expressions of dissent.  Then I'll probably write a blog about it.

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